Japana Sociala Forumo
イギリス政府の機密文書
ダウニングストリート・メモ全８部
１ ダウニングストリート・メモ（０２年７月２３日） 解説と訳文 英文ＨＴＭＬ 英文ＰＤＦ
"The secret Downing Street memo," The Sunday Times (May 1, 2005).
Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fi xed around the policy. . .
It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. . .
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. . .
If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work. . .
２ 内閣府のメモ／侵略の条件（０２年７月２１日）
"Cabinet Office paper: Conditions for military action," The Sunday Times (June 12, 2005).
The US Government's military planning for action against Iraq is proceeding apace. But, as yet, it lacks a political framework. In particular, little thought has been given to creating the political conditions for military action, or the aftermath and how to shape it. . .
When the Prime Minister discussed Iraq with President Bush at Crawford in April he said that the UK would support military action to bring about regime change. . .
We need now. . .to encourage the US Government to place its military planning within a political framework. . .This is particularly important for the UK because it is necessary to create the conditions in which we could legally support military action. Otherwise we face the real danger that the US will commit themselves to a course of action which we would find very difficult to support. . .
US views of international law vary from that of the UK and the international community. Regime change per se is not a proper basis for military action under international law. . .
An information campaign will be needed which has to be closely related to an overseas information campaign designed to influence Saddam Hussein, the Islamic World and the wider international community. This will need to give full coverage to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, including his WMD, and the legal justification for action. . .
３ ストロー外相のメモ（０２年３月２５日） 漏洩文書ＰＤＦ
The rewards from your visit to Crawford will be few. The risks are high, both for you and for the Government. . .
If 11 September had not happened, it is doubtful that the US would now be considering military action against Iraq. In addition, there has been no credible evidence to link Iraq with UBL and Al Qaida. Objectively, the threat from Iraq has not worsened as a result of 11 September. What has however changed is the tolerance of the international community (especially that of the US), the world having witnesses on September 11 just what determined evil people can these days perpetuate. . .
A legal justification is a necessary but far from sufficient pre-condition for military action. We have also to answer the big question - what will this action achieve? There seems to be a larger hole in this than on anything. Most of the assessments from the US have assumed regime change as a means of eliminating Iraq's WMD threat. But none has satisfactorily answered how that regime change is to be secured, and how there can be any certainty that the replacement regime will be better. . .
４ リケッツ政治顧問のメモ（０２年３月２２日） 漏洩文書ＰＤＦ
First, the THREAT. The truth is that what has changed is not the pace of Saddam Hussein's WMD programmes, but our tolerance of them post-11 September. . .the best survey of Iraq's WMD programmes will not show much advance in recent years on the nuclear, missile or CW/BW fronts. . .
US scrambling to establish a link between Iraq and Al Qaida is so far frankly unconvincing. . .
But we are still left with a problem of bringing public opinion to accept the imminence of a threat from Iraq. . .
５ メイヤー駐米大使のメモ（０２年３月１８日） 漏洩文書ＰＤＦ
Paul Wolfowitz, the Duputy Secretary of Defense, came to Sunday lunch on 17 March. . .On Iraq I opened by sticking very closely to the script that you used with Condi Rice last week. We backed regime change, but the plan had to be clever and failure was not an option. It would be a tough sell for us demestically, and probably tougher elsewhere in Europe. The US could go it alone if it wanted to. But if it wanted to act with partners, there had to be a strategy for building support for military action against Saddam. I then went through the need to wrongfoot Saddam on the inspectors and the UN SCRs and the critical importance of MEPP as an integral part of the anti-Saddam strategy. If all this could be accomplished skilfully, we were fairly confident that a number of countries would come on board. . .
６ マニング外交政策顧問のメモ（０２年３月１４日） 漏洩文書ＰＤＦ
Condi's enthusiasm for regime change is undimmed. But there were some signs, since we last spoke, of greater awareness of practical difficulties and political risks. . .
７ 内閣府海外および国防事務局のメモ（０２年３月８日） 漏洩文書ＰＤＦ
A leagal justification for invasion would be needed. Subject to Law Officers advice, none currently exists. This makes moving quickly to invade leagally very difficult. . .
８ 侵略の合法性に関するメモ（０２年３月８日） 漏洩文書ＰＤＦ
The more difficult issue is whether we are still able to rely on the same legal base for the use of force more than three years after the adoption of resolution 1205 (1998). . .Our interpretation of resolution 1205 was controversial anyway; many of our partners did not think the legal basis was sufficient as the authority to use force was no explicit. Reliance on it now would be unlikely to receive any support. . .
関連する機密文書
ゴールドスミス法務長官のメモ（０３年３月７日） 公開文書ＰＤＦ 英文ＨＴＭＬ
０５年７月２７日、英テレビ局チャンネル４がニュース番組で入手した機密文書の一部を公開した。文書はゴールドスミス法務長官がブレア首相へ送ったメモで、イラク侵略には十分な法的根拠がないこと示唆するものだった。それまで武力行使の正当性が問われるたびにメモの存在が指摘されたが、ブレアは公開を拒みつづけてきた。大臣や閣僚たちにも見せていなかった。
しかし、総選挙の直前にメモがリークされると、即座にブレアは対応を迫られ、官邸の公式サイトに全文を掲載するように指示した。そして、別になにも隠すことはないといって、ブレアは次のように断言した。
──これが決定的な証拠になると言われていたようだが、なんのことはない、湿った花火みたいなものだ──
It is also possible that CND may try to bring further action to stop military action in the domestic courts, but I am confident that the courts would decline jurisdiction as they did in the case brought by CND last November. Two further, though probably more remote possibilities, are an attempted prosecution for murder on the grounds that the military action is unlawful and an attempted prosecution for the crime of aggression. Aggression is a crime under customary international law which automatically forms part of domestic law. It might therefore be argued that international aggression is a crime recognised by the common law which can be prosecuted in the UK courts. . .
In short, there are a number of ways in which the opponents of military action might seek to bring a legal case, internationally or domestically, against the UK, members of the Government, or UK military personnel. Some of these seem fairly remote possibilities, but given the strength of opposition to military action against Iraq, it would not be surprising if some attempts were made to get a case of some sort off the ground. We cannot be certain that they would not succeed. . .
That is not to say that action may not be taken to remove Saddam Hussein from power if it can be demonstrated that such action is a necessary and proportionate measure to secure the disarmament of Iraq. But regime change cannot be the objective of military action. This should be borne in mind in considering the list of military targets and in making public statements about any campaign. . .
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